Good but Not Great: Autonomous Vehicles and the Law in Florida
Jeffery Mackowski
* PART I. INTRODUCTION
A bright sun shines in the crisp blue sky, beating down on Florida during a rather pleasant summer afternoon. Alice and Bob are happily married. Alice is a licensed driver in the state of Florida. Bob is blind, and he does not have a license to drive. Together, they own an autonomous vehicle (AV), colloquially known as a self-driving car. Alice and Bob want to travel to a restaurant for dinner. Once they both get in the AV, Alice indicates their destination and causes the AV to engage (i.e., Alice pushes the start button). The AV transports the couple safely to the restaurant, obeying all traffic laws, and utilizing public roadways. Alice's sister, Carol, wants to join the couple for dinner. Alice sets the AV's destination to Carol's home and causes the AV to engage. While empty and without any human capable of taking control, the AV drives on public roadways to Carol's home. Once there, Carol, a licensed driver, gets in the AV, sets the destination, and causes the AV to engage. Once again, the AV safely travels on public roadways without incident. Under Florida's current motor vehicle laws, this scenario is perfectly legal.
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This scenario raises some interesting and important legal issues. Is AV technology a good idea? Who (or what) is the legal operator of the AV? Who is responsible if something goes wrong? Can an AV break the law? What impact does AV technology have on strict-liability noncriminal offenses? What about intoxicated driving? What happens if Alice uses the AV for illegal racing? Should the AV allow her to break the law? Can Bob, who does not have a driver license because he is blind, use the AV by himself? If he cannot, does it make sense to allow the AV to drive on public roadways without any human passengers? How should law enforcement be allowed to stop an AV? Who has standing to challenge a search of an AV? If a hacker took control of the AV, is this virtual car-jacking governed by existing law? Should all AVs be equipped with a "black box" type data billion was spent on AV research and development in 2011, and this amount is predicted to increase to $130 billion by 2016. 17 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has defined five levels of vehicle automation. 18 At level 0, "[n]o-automation," the driver is completely in control of the vehicle's speed, steering, and other functions required for safe operation on the roadway (such as monitoring for pedestrians). 19 At level 1, "function-specific automation," the driver is still in control of the vehicle's safe operation, but the vehicle has some technology that assists the driver with steering or speed, monitoring the roadway, or a combination of both. 20 At level 2, "combined function automation," the vehicle is capable of controlling both speed and steering such that the driver need only monitor the roadway and be available to take control "at all times and on short notice." 21 At level 3, "limited self-driving automation," the vehicle assumes "safety-critical functions under certain traffic or environmental conditions . . . so that the driver is not expected to constantly monitor the roadway while driving." 22 At level 4, "full selfdriving automation," the vehicle is in complete control of all functions, including monitoring the roadways, such that the vehicle is capable of operating while unoccupied. 23 The discussion and analysis contained within this Comment is focused on level 4 AVs, full self-driving automation. The Florida Legislature recognizes the difference between an AV with full selfdriving automation and vehicles with lesser levels of automation. Id. at 4. 20 Id. (Examples of function specific automation include traditional cruise control and collision warning systems.). 21 Id. at 5 (An example of combined function automation is adaptive cruise control, which maintains the vehicle's speed relative to the other traffic on the roadway, and lane centering, which steers the vehicle without a driver's input.). 22 Id. (An example of limited self-driving automation is a self-driving car that alerts the driver when it encounters a condition, such as a construction zone, where the automation system will not function properly.). 23 
Id.
(At this level of automation, "safe operation rests solely on the automated vehicle system.").
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See FLA. STAT. § 316.003(90) (2015) (Defining an AV as " [a] ny vehicle equipped with autonomous technology. The term 'autonomous technology' means technology installed on a motor vehicle that has the capability to drive the vehicle on which the technology is installed without the active control or monitoring by a human operator. The term excludes a motor vehicle enabled with active safety systems or driver assistances systems . . . unless any such system alone or in combination with other systems enables the vehicle on which the technology is installed to drive without the active control
B. Current Technology Limitations
Fully automated technology is "very early stage technology." 25 Google's fully autonomous car can operate on a roadway without any "extra cautious driving to avoid making a mistake . . . only if intricate preparations have been made beforehand." 26 Google's fully autonomous car has many unresolved issues including driving in snow or heavy rain. 27 Other issues include "big, open parking lots or multilevel garages . . . [and] being blinded when the sun is directly behind a light." 28 Limitations of the car's sensors mean that it "can't tell if a road obstacle is a rock or a crumpled piece of paper, so the car will try to drive around either. . . . [T] he car can't detect potholes or spot an uncovered manhole if it isn't coned off." 29 Despite these current limitations, experts in the field of self-driving vehicles (academics, engineers, researchers, and automobile industry insiders) agree that between 2015 and 2025 fully automated AVs will surpass human drivers in all safety metrics.
PART III. THE BENEFITS OF AV TECHNOLOGY: SAFETY, EFFICIENCY, AND MOBILITY
The benefits of AVs fall into three categories: (1) safety; (2) efficiency; and (3) mobility. 31 The Florida legislature recognized efficiency and mobility when it enacted statutes authorizing the use of AVs on public roads. 32 Each of these three categories is discussed briefly below.
A. Safety
Automobile accidents in the United States are a serious public health concern.
33 Operator error accounts for over 95 percent of all automobile or monitoring by a human operator.") (emphasis added). 34 In the United States in 2010, "32,788 people were killed in motor vehicle traffic crashes." 35 Given that operator error is the major cause of these fatalities, it follows that reducing or even completely removing the role of the operator will decrease the number of accidents thus saving lives. 36 In addition to saving lives and reducing injuries, the use of AVs will reduce property damage as well. 37 Simply put, self-driving cars are safer than human-operated cars.
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) has examined the likely potential impact that AVs will have on automobile safety, concluding that "AV technology can dramatically reduce the frequency of crashes." 38 Automobile features categorized at the level 0 and level 1 of automation, such as lane departure warning and forward collision warning, could prevent an estimated one-third of fatal automobile accidents. 39 Drug and alcohol impaired drivers, distracted drivers, and fatigued drivers are the cause of 40 percent of fatal automobile accidents. 40 Level 4 technology is capable of eliminating these underlying human conditions by allowing the AV to take control of the automobile.
B. Efficiency
AVs are more convenient to share than traditional vehicles.
Many families now own more than one car, to satisfy the needs of two working spouses and a teenager or two. When a single car can drop one person off at work, and then drive home to drop off the next person, and then shuttle the kids to school and after-school events, and then pick up the parents at the end of the day, demand for cars may POLICYMAKERS xiv (2014), www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR443-1.html. plummet. One car may provide ample transportation for not just one family, but several.
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Traffic congestion is part of the operation of traditional vehicles in the United States, and traffic congestion "leads to unproductive time of about thirty-six hours for the average commuter each year." 43 There is also the monetary loss of $87.2 billion per year from vehicle fuel that is consumed needlessly because of traffic congestion. 44 AV technology counters both of these inefficiencies. First, the AV allows the person inside to be a passenger, rather than an operator, and thus able to conduct productive tasks (or take a nap) essentially transforming the vehicle into a virtual office (or bedroom). Second, in a transportation scheme where all vehicles are autonomous, coordinated traffic "can lead to a fuel saving in the order of 20-25%." 45 Estimates suggest that the automobile insurance industry will benefit as the number of traffic accidents is reduced by AVs, resulting in auto insurance premium reductions of over $37 billion per year in the United States.
C. Mobility
If one assumes that a person inside an AV is a passenger, then the existing infrastructure of our current roadway system becomes available to individuals who cannot operate traditional vehicles. AVs "can help elderly or disable citizens keep an active lifestyle such as running daily errands and maintaining social relationships." 47 The same is true for teenagers. AV technology will surely benefit individuals with cognitive or visual impairments.
An important aspect of the benefit to mobility provided by AVs is that AV technology can utilize already existing infrastructure. 48 very same roads that exist today. This is a massive increase in independence provided by the mobility of AVs. A blind person could own (or share) an AV to run errands or pursue leisure activities rather than rely on friends, relatives, government sponsored aid workers, or public transportation. In addition to people with impairments, parents could send their children to school or daycare without leaving work. The family AV would function as a personal, and flawless, chauffeur.
However, in Florida, an AV must always be operated by a person and engaged by a licensed driver. 49 This significantly hinders the benefit of mobility. A blind person still must rely on someone with a valid driver license, to engage the AV on his or her behalf. A son or daughter being picked-up from high school also needs a licensed driver to actually engage the AV. This may be as simple as having a person with a valid driver license remotely engage the AV, perhaps by use of a smartphone. This remote activation, however, is still inconvenient and nowhere near as simple as allowing a person without a driver license, such as a blind individual, to engage an AV on his or her own. This issue would be resolved if Florida recognized that an AV operates itself and removes the requirement that the operator of an AV have a valid driver license. If there is a malfunction in an AV with a blind occupant, what difference does it make if the blind person engaged the AV or if a licensed driver engaged the AV remotely? There is no difference whatsoever. The same goes for a child. In either event, the person who engaged the AV is liable for any resulting harm, which is ridiculous. The harm here is caused by either a manufacturing defect or something other than the AV, but in no situation is the harm caused by a person who tells the AV, remotely, "drive to the high school."
PART IV. THE LEGAL PARADIGM OF AUTOMOBILES
A. The discussion will focus on the criminal liability regime as it pertains to offenses that require: (1) an intent element; and (2) a person be in control of the vehicle. Reckless driving, vehicular manslaughter, and driving under the influence all have an intent element as well as require a person to be in control of the vehicle. Strict liability offenses pose an interesting issue because one of the strongest promises of AVs is a car that always has a flawless driver.
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In Florida, the criminal offense of Reckless Driving requires an intent element of "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." 58 In Florida, vehicular homicide is a felony 59 with an intent element of recklessness. 60 The Florida statute prohibiting driving under the influence (DUI) does not contain an express intent element. 61 However, a prima facie element of the DUI offense is that the person is under the influence of an intoxicating substance "to the extent that the person's normal faculties are impaired." 62 This element of intoxication itself requires more than strict liability, at least implicitly. 63 The important language from Florida's DUI statute, as it pertains to this Comment, is the phrase "if the person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle." 64 The analysis 52 Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 4, at 1158.
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Id. at 1159 (Examples of strict liability vehicular offenses include "speeding infractions, driving without proof of insurance, and even parking tickets."). 54 Id. ("These include any vehicular crime that has a mens rea requirement-most notably, criminal vehicular homicide.") (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.21 (2011)). 55 Id. (using implied consent as an example) (citing CAL. VEH. CODE § 23612 (2012) may be required for the safe testing and operation of motor vehicles equipped with autonomous technology." 72 The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) submitted the required report (DHSMV report) on February 10, 2014. 73 The DHSMV report states that the "current Florida laws are brief, requiring a licensed driver, unless on a closed course, to monitor the autonomous mode and intervene, when necessary." 74 The DHSMV report references AV legislation enacted in Nevada, California, the District of Columbia, Michigan, and Ontario, Canada.
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The DHSMV report is flawed. The DHSMV had twenty-one months to submit its report, "recommending additional legislative or regulatory action," to the Florida Legislature. 76 During those twenty-one months, the DHSMV not only "participated in the Autonomous Vehicle Summit," but was "also involved extensively in autonomous vehicle research, planning, and outreach."
77 Yet despite all this effort, the DHSMV created a report that is a mere seven pages.
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The DHSMV report relies heavily on the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) recommendations. 79 The DHSMV report is careful to point out that these are just recommendations and the "NHTSA has not established safety standards for autonomous vehicles." 80 The DHSMV "reviewed NHTSA's recommendations and practices in other states to determine if Florida's current laws are satisfactory."
81 After a review of the NHTSA recommendations, the report finds that current Florida laws satisfy only four of the eight recommendations. See AV Report, supra note 73, at 6 (2014). 78 Id. at 1-7 (The DHSMV report actually contains only six pages of text (2,779 words); the first page is a cover page.). 79 Id. at 3-6 (2014). 80 Id. at 3. 81 Id. at 4.
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See id. at 3; see also Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles, at 11-14 (2013), www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/ Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf. The NHTSA recommends that states: (1) "Ensure that the driver understands how to operate a self-driving vehicle safely;" (2) "Ensure that on-road testing of self-driving vehicles minimizes risks to other road users;" (3) "Limit testing operations to roadway, traffic and environmental conditions suitable for the capabilities of the tested self-driving vehicles;" (4) "Establish reporting requirements to monitor the performance of self-driving technology during testing;" (5) "Ensure that the process for transitioning from self-driving mode to driver control is safe, simple, and establishing the metric for determining whether Florida's current laws are satisfactory, and then finding that they are not, the DHSMV makes a single recommendation, "The Department recommends that the State of Florida establish working relationships with motor vehicle manufacturers and technology developers to encourage these business opportunities."
83 After all due consideration, the DHSMV "proposes no changes to existing Florida laws and rules at this time." 84 Why, after finding that the current Florida laws meet only half of the NHTSA's recommendations, does the DHSMV make a single recommendation and go on to propose no changes to Florida law rather than offer solutions (including solutions from other states' statutes)? In part, the DHSMV correctly understands that the difference between recommendations and standards. 85 Further, Florida's current laws require that any AV operated in Florida "is required to comply with existing federal and state safety and traffic regulations."
86 Ultimately, the DHSMV simply throws up its hands and declares that " [p] olicy-making at this juncture is difficult, at best." 87
Operation and Testing Purposes
Not only is the DHSMV report flawed in its single recommendation and lack of proposals, but it misinterprets Florida's current AV laws. The DHSMV report clearly references both section 316.85 and 316.86. This is evident in the report's statement that "[t]he person who engages the autonomous technology is deemed the operator," 88 which is a clear reference to Florida Statute section 316.85(2). 89 The DHSMV report claims that "the Florida Legislature authorized the testing of AVs in Florida." 90 The DHSMV report also concludes that "[c]urrent Florida laws allow manufacturers of autonomous technology to test on Florida's public timely;" (6) "Self-driving test vehicles should have the capability of detecting, recording, and informing the driver that the system of automated technologies has malfunctioned;" (7) "Ensure that the installation and operation of any self-driving vehicle technologies does not disable any federally required safety features or systems;" and (8) "Ensure that self-driving test vehicles record information about the status of the automated control technologies in the event of a crash or lass of vehicle control." 83 AV Report, supra note 73, at 7 (2014). 84 Id.
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Id. (" [T] here are no national safety standards and many unknowns."). 86 Id.
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Id.
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Id. roadways." 91 The DHSMV report does not address AV operation for nontesting purposes.
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I contend that the DHSMV report mistakenly interprets Florida's AV statutes to limit AV to testing only. 93 institutions, for the purpose of testing the technology. For testing purposes, a human operator shall be present in the AV such that he or she has the ability to monitor the vehicle's performance and intervene, if necessary, unless the vehicle is being tested or demonstrated on a closed course. Before the start of testing in this state, the entity performing the testing must submit to the department an instrument of insurance, surety bond, or proof of self-insurance acceptable to the department in the amount of $5 million.
(2) The original manufacturer of a vehicle converted by a third party into an AV shall not be liable in, and shall have a defense to and be dismissed from, any legal action brought against the original manufacturer by any person injured due to an alleged vehicle defect caused by the conversion of the vehicle, or by equipment installed by the converter, unless the alleged defect was present in the vehicle as originally manufactured.
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The DHSMV's interpretation creates inconsistency between the various Florida laws that govern AVs and violates the legislative intent. An interpretation of the plain language of the statutes leads to the conclusion that current Florida laws do not limit the operation of AVs on Florida's public roadways to testing purposes. This conclusion is further bolstered by the legislative intent behind the statutes.
The scope of these two sections is drastically different, and based on the plain language of the statutes, it is clear that section 316.85 is broad and section 316.86 is narrow. Section 316.85(2) begins with the language, "For purposes of this chapter," clearly establishing that this subsection applies broadly to the entirety of Chapter 316 of the Florida Statutes. 100 The title language of section 316.86, which begins, "Operation of vehicles equipped with autonomous technology on roads for testing purposes," establishes that section 316.86 is narrow in its scope, and does not apply to any other statute. 101 While the Florida statutes do not define the term "testing," that term, as it relates to AVs, is only used in section 316.86. 102 The plain language of section 316.85(2) demonstrates that AVs may be operated for any purpose, not solely for testing purposes, because this section applies to the testing section (316. If the DHSMV report is correct by indicating that, in Florida, an AV may only be operated for testing purposes, then "a human operator shall be present" 109 in the AV at all times, thus making the language of Florida Statute section 316.85(2), "regardless of whether the person is physically present" excess and surplus text that serves no purpose. The DHSMV report's assertion that any AV operation in Florida is solely for testing purposes, although not stating this expressly, may interpret these portions of the statute to coexist. Perhaps the language in section 316.85(2) is simply meant to attach culpability to a tester-operator that, for whatever reason, engages an empty AV remotely.
This interpretation, that the text of section 316.85(2) is merely a prophylactic to assign legal blame in the event of a mishap, is absurd given that: (1) section 316.86 requires that "a human operator shall be present" during
111 There is no logical reason to conclude that section 316.86(1) relies on section 316.85(2) to determine the operator of an AV on public roads for testing purposes. Section 316.86 not only requires that the operator of the AV be physically present in the AV, it requires a human operator to be present in the testing AV, "unless the vehicle is being tested or demonstrated on a closed course."
112 Although term "closed course" is not defined by Florida law, 113 the plain usage of the term means roadways not accessible to the public. 114 Interpreting Florida laws to limit AV use "for testing purposes" only means that a human operator will be present in the AV when the AV is on public roadways, but this interpretation cannot coexist with the plain language from 316.85 that confirms an AV may operate "regardless of whether the person is physically present in the vehicle."
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The need to assign culpability to a specific operator is not necessary given section 316.86's requirement that "the entity performing the testing must submit to the department [of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] an instrument of insurance . . . in the amount of $5 million."
116 This drastically limits the need to assign legal blame to the operator of an AV on a closed course (the only place AV testing may take place without a human operator) because the testing entity (with their $5 million dollars of insurance) is legally responsible for unoccupied AV. Further, if interpreted to apply to the entirety of Florida's AV laws, the financial responsibility clause of section 316.86 is inconsistent with section 627.0653. Section 627.0653(6) authorizes the Office of Insurance Regulation to approve a discount on insurance premiums for AVs. 117 If these statutes are construed to limit AV operation to testing purposes only, then the requirement that the testing entity have $5 million dollars of insurance coverage contradicts the authorization of discounted insurance for AVs.
Yet another inconsistency that results from construing Florida laws to restrict AVs to testing only is seen in Florida's ban on texting while driving. 110 Id.
111
Id. 
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Although this text from the session law was not codified, 126 it was still approved by Governor Rick Scott and provides a lens by which to examine the statutes that were codified in order to help clarify the current state of the law. The phrase "testing or operation" is a clear indication that the Florida Legislature considers the use of AVs for testing purposes something different than the operation of AVs because of the use of "or." The use of the word "or," rather than "and," shows that the Legislature is aware that the AVs can be used for testing purposes or operated for transportation purposes. This is reflected in the enactment of sections 316.85 and 316.86 as separate pieces of legislation as well as the interrelationships between all of Florida's current AV laws.
It is important to note that unlike many other sections of Florida Statutes Chapter 316, there are no specific punishments for violations of sections 316.85 or 316.86. 127 Florida law does provide that a driver convicted of a violation of any offense prohibited by chapter 316 that results in an accident "may have his or her driving privileges revoked."
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So even if the DHSMV is correct and AVs may only be operated for testing purposes, a person who violates this law is only subject to a suspension of driving privileges if an accident occurs. Regardless of the interpretation of Florida's AV laws, enforcement is difficult because those laws lack teeth.
The Laws of Nevada
An examination of Nevada's legislation governing the use of AVs reveals that Nevada legislators do not want the issue of criminal liability to go before the courts as a matter of first impression without legislative intent to guide the judicial branch. 129 The Nevada statute offers key definitions for the terms "autonomous system," "AV," and "manufacturer." 130 The legislation enacted in Nevada is not self-executing, rather it mandates that the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) adopts regulations to govern the use of AVs in the state. 131 On February 15, 2012, Nevada's DMV adopted such regulations. uncertainty of blame that my result from a tort suit." 133 The Nevada regulations specifically state that they apply to fully AV systems and not to already existing ADAS such as "a safety system or driver assistance system, including, without limitation, a system to provide electronic blind spot assistance, crash avoidance, emergency braking, parking assistance, adaptive cruise control, lane keep assistance, lane departure warnings and traffic jam and queuing assistance."
134 This legislative scheme is designed to prevent users of existing technology from "becoming unexpectedly regulated by a new legal regime." 135 The Nevada regulations place a premium on the safety of the other vehicles and their drivers that share the road with AVs. The regulation requires an override switch, a mechanism that disengages the autonomous technology and allows the person that utilized the mechanism to take control of the vehicle manually. 136 Additionally, the regulations require that a notification alert system activates when there is a malfunction with the autonomous technology with the intent that a passenger thus alerted will engage the override mechanism.
137 Seemingly with an eye towards both civil and criminal liability, the Nevada regulations require that any AV:
[Have] a separate mechanism in addition to, and separate from, any other mechanism required by law, to capture and store the autonomous technology sensor data for at least 30 seconds before a collision occurs between the AV and another vehicle, object or natural person while the vehicle is operating in autonomous mode. The autonomous technology sensor data must be captured and stored in a read-only format by the mechanism so that the data is retained until extracted from the mechanism by an external device capable of downloading and storing the data. Such data must be preserved for 3 years after the date of collision. The provisions of this paragraph do not authorize or require the modification of any other mechanism to record data that is installed on the AV in compliance with federal law. 138 The requirement of this recording mechanism demonstrates that the "Nevada DMV is already anticipating a situation wherein these AVs are 133 Swanson, supra note 66, at 1117. 139 Such a device will no doubt be useful to determine not only civil liability, but criminal liability as well. 140 AVs equipped with some type of apparatus that gathers and stores sensory information would be invaluable to determine whether a natural person would have been able to utilize a disengage mechanism and prevent a criminal act, such as some form of vehicular homicide.
The Nevada regulations also include a geographic limitation. When the Nevada DMV issues a license permitting the use of an AV, a certificate is issued allowing the AV to only operate within a specific geographic area.
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To obtain a certificate to use the AV in other areas, the licensee must establish that the AV is "capable of being driven in the conditions of the proposed geographic location in compliance with the traffic laws and other laws applicable to drivers and motor vehicles" with that region. 142 This provision of the regulations enables the Nevada DMV to control the specific areas where AVs will operate, allowing a certain plasticity in responding to policy concerns including public fear of cars that drive without human interaction.
The Laws of California
California's AV laws, as of February 2016, "are very similar to Florida's." 143 However, there are some notable differences between the two states' AV laws. A prime difference is California's inclusion of the text, "[A] motor vehicle shall not be operated in autonomous mode on public roads in California except as permitted under . . . the regulations in this article." 144 The lack of similar language in Florida's laws gives rise to inconsistent interpretations of whether an AV can be operated for nontesting purposes. California law also requires that AV manufacturers have a test driver training program. 145 California law, like Nevada, requires the AV manufacturer to report motor vehicle accidents involving AVs to the state within ten days. 146 Florida AV law establishes operator liability by defining the term "operator" to mean the person who engages the AV, 147 while California AV law is more aggressive and requires the AV manufacturer's agent to sign a document "binding" the manufacturer to the AV for liability 139 Swanson, supra note 66, at 1121. 163 AV technology has a great potential to improve our quality of life, but only if the law changes in a fashion that promotes the wide spread use of the technology as it advances. However, the U.S. legal systems "acts to retard the introduction of new and beneficial technology." 164 As new technology emerges and is adopted, there is a concern that liability issues will impede innovation. 165 AV liability issues will arise from users, consumers, insurance companies, and manufacturers. 166 Insurance companies are a likely ally for the adoption of AV technology because the safety benefits of this technology will lower these companies' bottom line. 167 169 Swanson, supra note 66, at 1095. 170 Garza, supra note 165, at 595-97 ("General Motors 'consistently contested the value of belts, tried to minimize their importance for the industry and attempted to discourage their adoption. '") were concerns that cruise control technology may keep the throttle open and lead to wrecks." 171 Additionally, both vehicle safety experts and manufacturers were "concerned that a driver 'with literally nothing to do except steer and ruminate' would be 'more likely to drop off for 40 fatal winks.'" 172 Ultimately, "manufacturers have benefitted from the implementation of these technologies." 173 An examination of the history of air bag technology offers useful lessons learned. The National Highway Transportation and Safety Agency, in 1977, estimated that air bags could prevent over 12,000 vehicle collision fatalities and an additional 100,000 vehicle collision injuries. 174 Part of the push to adopt air bag technology was an effort to reduce fatalities and injuries from vehicle collisions "by replacing a human responsibility [of using seat belts] with a technical artifact [self-deploying air bags]." 175 Today, air bags "are installed in almost every vehicle due to changing public attitudes on vehicle safety and air bag expectations as well as improved technology and testing of airbags." 176 However, automakers were hesitant to adopt airbag technology, primarily because they were "frightened of taking on the liability that would accompany their involvement in an air bag strategy." 177 Ultimately, automakers embraced air bag technology, in large part, because their potential liability for occupants in vehicles equipped with air bags was greatly reduced as the attitude of viewing air bags favorably increased. 178 AV technology is likely to enjoy the same upward trend of acceptability from the public as airbags. 179 Federal or state legislation that would limit or protect against liability for AV manufacturers would help this socially beneficial technology become widely adopted. 180 It is within the realm of the legislature to enact statutes or delegate agencies to create regulations that apportion liability, both civil and criminal, between AV manufacturers and users. 181 Nevada's [Vol. 11:221 AV statute delegates regulatory power to the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles. 182 The statute requires the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles to create regulations that govern safety standards, testing methods, insurance requirements, and "such other requirements as the Department determines to be necessary." 183 Legislatures should be proactive in establishing statutes or regulations that apportion liability to prevent the question of liability involving AVs from being brought "before a court as a matter of first impression with no statutory direction." 184 In order to ensure that manufacturer liability does not become "a barrier that blocks the introduction of this socially beneficial new technology," 185 legislatures should act to provide manufacturers with "liability protection, or preemption, to ensure AVs are not unduly impeded by liability concerns." 186 There is historic precedent for new and emerging technologies to be protected by legislative efforts to limit liability. 187 The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act was enacted in 1957 to limit liability to the nuclear industry. 188 In the transportation industry, the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 provided small plane (and small plane parts) manufacturers with immunity from liability for eighteen years. 189 Limited liability protections were enacted for vaccine manufacturers in the interest of greater public safety. 190 These federal laws were passed primarily because the "public health benefit of vaccines is undeniable, yet they are so frequently the source of lawsuits that federal preemption laws had to be passed to protect their manufacturers." 191 The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005 provides vaccine manufacturers with immunity from liability for harm resulting from vaccinations that take place during public health emergencies. 192 In 1986, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act was enacted to limit liability for manufacturers of 182 children's vaccines. 193 State legislatures have enacted similar liability limitations in the area of tort reform, specifically for medical malpractice, largely "to ameliorate the liability concerns faced by vulnerable, but promising, technologies." 194 The enormous safety benefits that AVs could provide for society demand that the legislature take proactive measures to ensure that liability will not hinder the implantation and adoption of this emerging technology. The model of liability protection established for vaccine manufactures should be looked to as legislators seek to maximize the benefits of this new AV technology while still giving persons that suffer harm a legal remedy as well as advancing the aims of the criminal liability regime.
Some legal scholars have suggested that AV manufacturers should be held to the same liability standards as common carriers. 195 This suggestion relies heavily on the idea that AVs are like common carriers because "they will engage in transportation services, their services will be widely available to the public, and the passenger's safety is not entirely within the control of the passenger." 196 This argument assumes that the manufacturer is the operator of the vehicle. 197 This assumption is flawed because a manufacturer of an AV, unlike the common carrier operator, will have little, if any, control of the vehicle after it is sold. While a manufacturer will have control over the design and implementation of the autonomous technology, it will be up to the user to conduct routine maintenance on the vehicle. Due to this partitioning between manufacturing and maintaining the autonomous technology, the heightened duty of carje imposed on common carriers 198 should not guide criminal liability for AV manufacturers.
The aims of the criminal liability regime are, in important part, to deter and punish conduct that society has deemed undesirable. 199 AV technology represents a new paradigm in automotive safety, efficiency, and mobility. 193 This is an emerging technology, and as such there will likely be real world harms as the automotive industry transitions to fully autonomous vehicles.
200 These harms will probably include the type of incidents that carry with them criminal liability, such as serious bodily harm and death. However, the overall benefit to society that this technology will provide substantially outweighs the need to deter or punish manufacturers under the criminal liability regime.
Yes, society deserves a remedy for when autonomous technology fails, and manufacturers should be held to a reasonable standard when designing and producing a potentially dangerous product to the market. The solution can be found in the historic precedent of limited liability for vaccine manufacturers. Simply put, existing products liability law 201 is well suited to handle civil liability issues for AV manufacturers, 202 and AV technology is too important to hold manufacturers criminally liable for their product. Florida law already provides some level of liability protection for manufactures. In Florida, the manufacturer of a traditional automobile is exempt from liability if a third party converts the traditional vehicle into an AV. 203 For the reasons stated previously in this section, specifically to maximize and enable the policy benefits from AVs, 204 Florida should relegate manufacturer liability of AVs to comport with existing tort law.
B. Individual Criminal Liability
The primary criminal liability issue that must be addressed is "that our current legal system assumes that the person in the driver's seat is in control of the vehicle, which is not necessarily the case with AVs." 205 Even with the current limitations of autonomous technology, almost all strict liability traffic offenses will be eliminated. 206 What remains is intent-based offenses and offenses that require a person to "operate" the vehicle. The problem with how these offenses are applied and analyzed for AVs is evidenced by the term "self-driving car." Is a person inside the vehicle a passenger or an operator?
"Is the 'driver' of an [AV] like the engineer of a train or pilot of an aircraft on 'autopilot,' or is she simply a passenger, with little or no control 200 of the vehicle's behavior?" 207 The answer to this question should be that a person inside an AV while operating in autonomous mode is presumed to be a passenger. This is the answer to the operator/passenger question because although the person inside the vehicle is indeed controlling the vehicle, by giving instructions such as the destination, the vehicle itself is in control of how those instructions are carried out. The test should be whether the person inside the vehicle is operating the vehicle in any meaningful way. The NHTSA has weighed in on this issue, determining that the software controlling an AV is the "driver" and anyone inside the vehicle is a mere "occupant."
208 Nobody would seriously argue that a passenger in a taxicab is operating the vehicle merely because that passenger told the driver where to go. In the case of AVs, the car itself is operating the vehicle and the person inside, issuing instructions, should be held to similar criminal liability standards as the passenger of a taxicab.
Laws that make driving under the influence a crime are challenged head-on by AVs. To the average consumer, purchasing an AV might be thought of as purchasing a personal taxi. This same person may presume that after a night of drinking, their AV would be capable of "delivering the intoxicated person home safely without any further interaction."
209
The most obvious legal issue from a criminal liability standpoint is created by the following scenario. An intoxicated person gets in their AV. The vehicle begins to drive the intoxicated person home. The AV is equipped with an alert and disengage system (required in Florida). 210 The vehicle is involved in an accident that results in death or serious bodily harm. The legal issue is causation: whether, but for the person's intoxication, the accident would have occurred. Because "[t]he possibility of removing drunk drivers from the road is one of the most prominent benefits [AVs] might provide," 211 legislatures should recognize that the person inside the vehicle is a passenger. To do otherwise would mean that instances of drunk driving are not as effectively reduced. Additionally, if this scenario were to substitute being blind for being intoxicated, the promise of increased mobility would also be strongly hindered. Id. at 1163 (describing this concept as "an 'I'm drunk, take me home' button").
210
See FLA. STAT. § 319.145.
211
There is another DUI situation that legislatures should address regarding AVs equipped with alert and disengage systems. What if an intoxicated person, due to their normal faculties being impaired, disengages autonomous operation and the result isof the vehicle, which results in death or serious bodily harm? Technology could provide for a "method of triggering this disengage option [through] the inclusion of in-car breathalyzers." 212 A legislative solution would be to recognize the crime of "autonomous DUI" in these situations. This could function similarly to situations where courts have found people to be in control of a vehicle simply by having their keys in their pocket, sleeping in their vehicle, while intoxicated.
213
The law in Florida is clear that some human is always the operator, even when the vehicle is empty. 214 The law in Florida also requires a system that alerts the operator if the autonomous technology fails 215 and a disengagement system that is "easily accessible to the operator" 216 to allow the person to take control of the vehicle in the event of a malfunction.
217
Florida legislators should, instead, borrow from Nevada's laws and require that "[i]f the driver is not present or is unable to safely take control of the vehicle, the vehicle must safely cause itself to come to a stop."
218
Noncriminal moving violations raise an interesting legal question, whether it is appropriate to punish, by issuance of a fine, for a traffic violation caused by the AV The majority of traffic offenses in Florida are strict liability, noncriminal traffic infractions. 219 Strict liability offenses lack a mens rea element because they are not concerned as much with moral culpability as they are with deterrence. 220 If an AV, while in autonomous mode and without a physically present operator, for whatever reason, fails to obey a police officer directing traffic, why should the human operator be issued a ticket? Florida's current AV legal regime would allow this human operator to be issued a ticket because that is the letter of the law. 221 The operator is not morally blameworthy, but moral blame is not contemplated by noncriminal strict liability offenses. 222 Yet issuing a ticket to the operator here does not further the aims of deterrence either. Here, the operator has no control of how the AV functions once it is engaged, and no amount of fines or tickets will change this.
Imagine being issued a ticket every time your smartphone went out of service. Would these tickets somehow make you stay in service? Of course not, and the same concept is at play with AVs. If anyone should be liable in this instance it is the manufacturer. This is similar to when a speedometer malfunctions resulting in a speeding ticket. The difference being that in the case of the faulty speedometer, an actual person with a valid driver license is present in the vehicle exercising control of the vehicle, and the argument can be made that the operator should realize how fast the vehicle is traveling based on context and experience.
C. Crimes Involving AVs
If a third party were to take control of an AV through hacking, a host of criminal issues are raised. If someone (regardless of whether the person is considered a passenger or operator) is inside the vehicle at the time the third party takes control, is this theft, kidnapping, carjacking, or something else entirely? Existing statutes may adequately address this issue. 223 State legislatures should enact new (or amend existing) statutes to address a situation in which an AV is hacked, and then involved in an accident that causes death or seriously bodily harm.
One issue that needs to be resolved is raised in the following hypothetical. An AV has an alert and disengage system. The law states that a person with access to this system is considered to be in control of the vehicle. The vehicle is hacked, and is now controlled by a third party. The alert and disengage system still functions. The AV, under the control of the hacker, kills a pedestrian. This death would have been avoided had the virtual carjacking victim utilized the disengage system. The issue that must be addressed by the legislature is whether "the ultimate responsibility for safe operation of the vehicle . . . remain [s] with the person with the ability to [use the disengage]." 224 The legislature should be proactive and place criminal liability on the hacker because the hacker's illicit actions are the proximate cause of the death.
AVs could potentially be used to transport contraband such as drugs because: (1) they obey all traffic laws resulting in a lower risk of being stopped by law enforcement; and (2) they can be operated without anyone in the vehicle so that if the vehicle is stopped and the contraband is found, the owner of the contraband may escape capture. Given the possible use of AVs as drug mules or otherwise transporting contraband, should AVs have some type of "black box" style data recorder? Nevada requires a black box type system in AVs that captures thirty seconds of data before a collision occurs. 225 This type of data capturing system could be accessed by law enforcement, subject to a traditional search analysis, even when the AV has not been in a collision. In light of the recent legal issues surrounding the use of GPS tracking devices on vehicles, 226 an extension of data collection requirement beyond collision and safety reporting seems likely to give rise to Fourth Amendment issues. A better policy would be to have law enforcement investigate, without resorting to data snooping, AVs found laden with contraband but without anyone physically present.
D. Searches of AVs
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable intrusion by the federal government. 227 The Fourth Amendment has been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 228 Although the Supreme Court has stated that a person's reasonable expectation of privacy is greater in a home than in an automobile, 229 the Court has also stated that "people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles. 234 However, it is well settled that the Fourth Amendment is implicated when law enforcement stops an automobile. 235 Once an automobile has been stopped by law enforcement, an officer must have a warrant, 236 obtain consent, 237 or establish probable cause in order to conduct a search of the vehicle. 238 Setting aside the issue of how law enforcement stops an AV (which dutifully obeys all traffic regulations and laws), 239 I will focus on the procedural issues presented when an AV is searched subsequent to a lawful stop.
In Florida, the operator of an AV is the person that "causes the vehicle's autonomous technology to engage, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the vehicle."
240 This definition of "operator" leads to legally unusual and unique situations pertaining to who has standing to challenge a search of an AV. If the operator of an AV is physically present in the vehicle, then the traditional jurisprudence regarding standing to challenge a search of an automobile applies. However, in Florida, because the operator of an AV need not be physically present, the issue of who has standing to challenge a search of an AV becomes unclear. I will address the following scenarios: (1) an AV with a physically present operator; (2) an AV without anyone physically present; and (3) an AV with a passenger that is not the operator. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (outlining the two prongs of Fourth Amendment privacy: (1) that a person must have an expectation of privacy; and (2) that expectation must be "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'"); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148 (finding no standing to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment when defendant was a "mere passenger" in an automobile); see generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON In the first scenario the AV's operator is physically present and a search occurs subsequent to a lawful traffic stop. This scenario should not be treated any differently than a traditional search subsequent to a lawful traffic stop. In this scenario a law enforcement officer is able to talk face-toface with the operator, ask routine questions, determine the operator's final destination, run a search for outstanding warrants, and ask for consent to conduct a search. Because the operator is physically present and able to act in every as a traditional driver at this point (when the AV is no longer being driven), there is no reason to deviate from the traditional search analysis in this scenario. Law enforcement will obtain a warrant, consent from the operator, or establish probable cause. The operator will have standing to challenge the search.
When an AV without anyone physically present is searched subsequent to a lawful stop, 241 traditional search analysis is substantially unaltered. In this scenario a law enforcement officer cannot speak to the AV operator to obtain consent. It has been suggested that implied consent laws should be enacted for AVs without a physically present operator. 242 This lack of face-to-face dialogue also creates a hurdle in establishing probable cause because the law enforcement office cannot utilize his or her observations of the operator's demeanor or ask the operator where his or her final destination is. Aside from this lack of interaction between law enforcement and the operator, the search analysis is unchanged. Essentially, the AV without a physically present operator will be treated like a parked car with retained mobility. In this scenario, the issue of standing to challenge the search is also based on traditional search analysis. The operator would have standing to challenge a search subsequent to a lawful stop even when not physically present because he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy, just like he or she would have in a parked car or luggage on a public bus. 243 The final scenario, in which the person inside the AV is not the operator, is the most interesting. The search analysis is almost the same as when the operator is present in the AV, except that a law enforcement officer would utilize the passenger's demeanor and statements regarding the final destination. Also, an officer may be able to obtain consent from the passenger, if the passenger is authorized to consent to the search. The operator of the AV would likely have standing to challenge a search subsequent to a lawful stop, for the reasons noted previously. However, the issue of whether the passenger has standing to challenge is more complex. Courts do not require ownership of a vehicle to assert standing to challenge a search. 245 However, in Rakas v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who was the passenger in an automobile did not have standing to challenge the search of the automobile because they did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. 246 It is unlikely that a court will find that a passenger in an AV operated by someone else (such as a child or other person without a driver license) has reasonable expectation of privacy in the AV itself because being a passenger in a "car with the permission of its owner is not determinative of whether [a passenger] had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched."
247 However, if a passenger who is not the owner of the AV is able to consent to a search, "then that same non-owner must have a protected privacy interest. The scope of the authority sufficient to grant a valid consent can hardly be broader than the contours of protected privacy." Id. at 148. 248 Id. at 163 (White, J., dissenting). PART VI. CONCLUSION AV technology will improve the safety, efficiency, and mobility benefits of our existing automobile infrastructure. In order to maximize these improvements, a new legal regime must be created. This new regime needs to recognize that an operator of an AV may actually be a mere passenger. This new regime must recognize that more often than not, an AV is its own operator. Florida's traffic laws and motor vehicle regulations should reflect this concept. The Nevada statutes governing AVs should be used as model legislation. This new regime must also address crimes against AVs, such as virtual carjackings, and autonomous crimes, and the use of an AV in the furtherance of a crime. Existing law can be readily adapted to address these crimes. By creating a new legal regime for AVs, the goals of deterrence and punishment can be met while achieving the benefits from autonomous technology.
